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Abstract: In a context of intense transnationalism, acute interdependence and pertinent 
global  trends,  the  conventional  patterns  of  democracy  are  increasingly  questioned  by 
new  standards  and  additional  levels.  This  paper  transgresses  the  ontological  locus  of 
democracy and aims to analyze the exercise of democratic accountability at global level, 
focusing on the EU practice in the spectrum of international security. The analysis begins 
with the conceptual framework of accountability, and seeks to clarify the meanings and 
mechanisms of democratic accountability within the architecture of global governance. 
The second part of the paper analyzes how the principle of democratic accountability is 
integrated in the planning and implementation of EU’s international security policies. The 
paper analyzes the forms of external accountability, peer and reputational, in the case of 
EU international counterterrorism policies. Finally, the paper assesses how the language 
of democratic accountability is used within the sphere of international security. Is the 
European rhetoric a mere recitation of the good governance norm, or a realistic investment 
towards an accountable exercise of power at global level? 
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Introduction 
 
Developed in a world that looked nothing like today, the Rousseauist concept of direct 
democracy is increasingly questioned by the forces of interdependence, transnationalism 
and the ubiquitous dynamics of global calculations. Although the absence of a global 
government, global elections and a global constitution makes the understanding and the 
functioning of democracy and democratic principles at global level difficult, the current 
developments  make  the  limited  perspective  of  democracy  only  within  the  borders  of 
individual nation-states  unrealistic. In other words, as today’s world consistently moves 
towards a substantial transnational level, we should adopt different lenses, and rethink the 
boundaries of democracy in order to understand the major changes undergone in the space 
of contemporary politics.  
Transgressing  the  ontological  locus  of  democracy,  this  paper  aims  to  analyze  the 
exercise of democratic accountability at global level, focusing on the EU practice in the 
spectrum of international security. The analysis begins with the conceptual framework of 
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accountability, and seeks to clarify what is meant by democratic accountability in global 
governance, how the principle of democratic accountability is performed at global scale 
and which are the attainable mechanisms of democratic accountability in the architecture of 
global governance. The second part of the paper analyzes how the principle of democratic 
accountability is integrated in the planning and implementation of EU’s international security 
policies. The analysis looks at the forms of external accountability, peer and reputational, in 
the case of EU international counterterrorism policies. In the final part, the paper assesses 
how the language of democratic accountability is used within the sphere of international 
security. Is the European rhetoric a mere recitation of the good governance norm, or a 
realistic investment towards an accountable exercise of power at global level? 
1. Democratic Accountability in the Global Governance Architecture 
 
The attempts of going beyond the territorial congruence of democracy and democratic 
principles are facing a complex puzzle. The absence of a global demos, the improbability 
of global elections or of a global government, are just a few of the conventional elements 
that cannot be performed in the architecture of contemporary global politics. However, 
despite the numerous obstacles regarding the functioning of democratic accountability 
mechanisms at the global level, it is possible to conceive forms of non-electoral democratic 
accountability, capable of overseeing the exercise of power at global level. 
The area of democratic accountability in the framework of global governance is a 
relatively new and overlooked domain. In most cases, the assessment of accountability 
at global scale departs from national or domestic terms, where the issue of accountability 
has been considered quite simplistic. For example, in democratic countries the principle 
of accountability is understood as the government responsibility to the people, in the base 
of a varied number of means, including election power with a universal franchise1. In 
the language of rational-choice, the accountability relationship is between the people as 
principals and government officials as their agents. Democratic accountability is defined 
as “a justificatory process based on the adequate control of the decision makers by the 
constituencies that create the foundations of a polity”2 or “being liable to be required to give 
an account or explanation of actions and, where appropriate, to suffer the consequences, 
take the blame or undertake to put matter right, if it should appear that errors have been 
made”3. 
Despite  the  relatively  simplistic  logic  of  the  concept  and  its  functions  at  domestic 
level, the reality is undoubtedly far more complex. For example, the principal encounters 
numerous difficulties in making full use of its rights, and in holding the agent accountable 
in an efficient manner.4 As Benner, Reinicke, and Witte argued, “the ideal of democracy is 
  1 Robert O. Keohane, “Accountability in World Politics”, Scandinavian Political Studies, No. 29, June 2006, p. 77.
  2 Raimo Väyrynen, “Political Power, Accountability, and Global Governance”, in Ruth Zimmerling (ed.) Globalization 
and Democracy, Tampere University Press, Tampere, p. 170. 
  3European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), “Report on the Democratic oversight of the 
Security Service”, Strasbourg 11 June 2007, p. 4.
  4 Björn Müller-Wille, “Improving the democratic accountability of EU intelligence”, Intelligence and National Security, 
Vol. 21, No. 1, 2007, p.101.52
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hard, if not impossible, to implement at the national level in its purest form”5. Moreover, the 
rapid extension of governance at global level has brought an additional level of reference, 
where the need for democratic accountability remains valid.  In the last decades, it became 
well known that while many aspects of economy, finance and social interaction, have 
acquired a substantial global dimension, the practices of democracy have largely failed 
to  keep  pace6.  However,  despite  the  limited  progresses,  the  attempts  of  approaching 
democratic accountability in global politics are not an absent pattern. 
In David Held’s point of view, democratic accountability in global politics would be 
one in which power-wielders would have to report to the people whose actions they 
profoundly affect, and be subject of sanctions from them7. Furthermore, the multilateralism 
cosmopolitan  perspective  of  Held  advances  the  perspective  of  adaptation  of  familiar 
models of democratic accountability at global level through overlapping and multilayered 
institutional forms, designed to restore the symmetry between rulers and ruled at all levels 
of  governance.  Contrarily  to  Held’s  assumptions,  Robert  Dahl  limited  the  conception 
of democratic accountability to the mechanism of popular control, and wrote about the 
absence  of  preconditions  of  democratic  accountability  in  global  politics,  “democratic 
accountability beyond the state is an unrealistic plan”8. 
Indeed, the absence of a global demos and a global government emphasize the need 
of being cautious about approaching the conventional democratic principles beyond the 
traditional spatial ideology of democracy. But, in the context of the new transnational 
developments of world politics, it is also necessary to avoid thinking of the space of global 
politics as a vacuum. In the words of Bellamy and Castiglione, “the very principles of 
democracy may need revision to meet post-national and global conditions”9. In consequence, 
the framework of accountability in global politics has to be approached with the types and 
practices of accountability that are appropriate at this scale10. As Robert Keohane points out, 
“there is no global government but there is global governance: authoritative rule-making 
with expectations of obedience and anticipated negative consequences of disobedience”11.   
Abandoning the domestic analogy, Michael Goodhart advanced an alternative model 
(AM) built as an approach to the “no demos” problem or “the breakdown of equivalence” 
between governing and governed12. In more explicit terms, the Goodhart model is based 
on the idea of adopting a conception of interests derived directly from the core principles 
  5 Thorsten Benner, Wolfgang H. Reinicke, Jan Martin Witte, “Multisectoral Networks in Global Governance: Towards 
a Pluralistic System of Accountability”, Government and Opposition, Vol. 39, No. 2, 2004, p. 206.
  6Jan Art Scholte, ed., Building Global Democracy. Civil Society and Accountable Global Governance Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2011, pp. 10-12.
  7 David Held, “Democratic Accountability and Political Effectiveness from a Cosmopolitan Perspective”, Government 
and Opposition, Vol. 39, No. 1, 2004, pp. 364-391.
  8 Robert Dahl, “Can International Organizations be Democratic? A Skeptic’s View”, in Ian Shapiro, Casiano Hacker-
Cordon (eds.), Democracy’s Edges, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, pp. 19-36.
  9 Richard Bellamy, Dario Castiglione, “The Uses of Democracy: Reflections on the European Democracy Deficit”, 
in Erik O. Eriksen, John E. Fossum (eds.), Democracy in the European Union: Integration through Deliberation?, 
Routledge, London, 2000, p. 68.
  10 Robert O. Keohane, “Global Governance and Democratic Accountability”, Miliband Lecture at the London School 
of Economics, May 17, 2002, p. 4. 
  11 Ruth W. Grant, Robert O. Keohane, “Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics”, American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 99, Jan. 2005, pp. 29-43.
  12 David Held, “Democratic Accountability and Political Effectiveness from a Cosmopolitan Perspective”, Government 
and Opposition, Vol. 39, No. 1, 2004, pp. 382-383.53
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of  democracy  by  focusing  on  democratic  norms  or  standards  of  accountability,  rather 
than on the identity of the appropriate accountability holders13. Rather than an insoluble 
issue  of  global  governance,  the  alternative  model  follows  other  means,  and  offers  an 
alternative perspective for the question “who watches the watchers?”. In other words, the 
Goodhart model re-conceptualizes democratic accountability as a problem of norms, rather 
than agents. In the case of international organisations, the AM model is understood as a 
mechanism that functions in three related ways. First, democratic human rights standards 
have  to  be  taken  into  account  in  decisions  and  operations.  Second,  the  international 
organisations have to institutionalize opportunities for deliberative input from groups and 
individuals to shape policies before implementation. Finally, the AM model requires the 
institutionalizations of opportunities for groups or individuals to sanction the policies that 
affect their rights. Goodhart explains his choice for the perspective of human rights has 
been formulated specifically for the global context, because “they share a commitment to 
freedom and equality, have a long association with emancipatory democratic theory [...] 
and because human rights do command a wide and meaningful global consensus today”14. 
It is important to note that the AM model is seen as an extension of the procedures 
available at domestic level and its aim is not to substitute the regular framework. As an 
epitome, the shift from agents to norms allows the AM to emphasize the normative standards 
that power and policies must respect. Instead of seeing democratic accountability as making 
power answerable to the right people, Goodhart reconceived democratic accountability as 
a way of making power answerable to the right standards. Democratic accountability in 
the space of global politics becomes normatively dependent upon a contingent system of 
rule, and offers an important base for the assessment of the accountability principle in the 
extended sphere of global politics. 
However, the broad view of norms proposed by Goodhart has to be supplemented with 
more specific mechanisms of assessment. In this case, Grant and Keohane15 have the merit of 
introducing in the sphere of global governance accountability, a system of seven individual 
mechanisms: hierarchical, supervisory, fiscal, legal, market, peer, and reputational, known 
as the “pluralistic accountability system of world politics”16. The principal aim of their 
perspective is to limit the abuses of power by agents of global governance, including 
international and nongovernmental organizations, transgovernmental networks, states and 
corporations. 
The forms of external accountability that are relevant for the analysis are peer and 
reputational mechanisms. In concrete terms, peer accountability indicates a process in 
the manner of multilateral forums, where the actions of similar organizations are open 
to debate17. The second mechanism, reputational accountability, defines the appropriate 
behavior of an actor in global politics, accentuating the perspective of norms. Although Grant 
and Keohane propounded a system of accountability, and not democratic accountability, 
  13 Michael Goodhart, “Democratic Accountability in Global Politics: Norms, not Agents”, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 
73, January 2011, p. 52.
  14 Ibid.
  15 Ruth W. Grant, Robert O. Keohane, “Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics”, American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 99, Jan. 2005, pp. 29-43.
  16 Ibid., p. 35.
  17 Ibid.54
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their mechanisms imply, in an indirect manner, strong democratic credentials. Similarly 
to the domestic sphere, the essential function of their accountability mechanisms seeks 
to create processes for preventing the abuse of power, thus ensuring the most important 
function of a democratic system. Furthermore, they point to a global accountability system 
not as an ideal accountability scheme, but as a way of limiting the abuses of power in a 
world with a wide variety of power-wielders and without a centralized government. In 
consequence, elections and representation are one way to achieve democratic credentials, 
but not the singular way. Democratic accountability can and should be achieved in many 
different ways, in accordance with the level and the characteristic of the analyzed spectrum. 
After all, it is contradictory to approach global governance and to manage global problems 
without democratic accountable frameworks, precisely because what the architecture of 
global governance proposes to the world politics is a solid commitment to the democratic 
principles, norms and mechanisms. 
Moreover,  despite  a  common  view  on  what  accountability  should  mean  in  the 
sphere  of  global  governance,  the  literature  argues  unanimously  that  the  international 
organizations and the new political entities that configure the scene of global politics must 
be accountable18. Democratic accountability is not only about preventing and neutralizing 
potential threats from the agent against the principal, but it is also about the promoting of 
good governance, understood as an efficient use of the state authority for the good of the 
people19. The concept of accountability entails thus a strong normative aspect, including 
under its umbrella the notions of justice, fairness, responsibility and integrity. In Müller-
Wille’s  words,  improvements  in  democratic  accountability  are  not  about  maximizing 
formal scrutiny, but it should rather be understood as a move towards good governance20. 
2. The European Case - Rhetoric and Performance in International Security 
  
The responsibility for creating effective and accountable mechanisms in the architecture 
of global governance revolves around the consecrated entities of international politics, but 
also around the new actors of the global stage. In fact, due to the global impact of their 
practices and their innovative means to approach and tackle the current transboundary 
issues, the international and nongovernmental organizations or the ample transnational 
networks are actively engaged in regulatory processes beyond domestic spaces, and are 
considered central pieces in contributing to the architecture of global governance and the 
advancement of democratic principles at global scale. In this regard, the EU’s prominent 
capability of influencing the variables of global governance makes the Union a major target 
of demand for democratic accountability. 
Departing from the assumption that democratic accountability specific to the framework 
of global governance does not follow the domestic pathway of accountability to whom, but 
it is justified through the course of accountability in what way, the second part of the paper 
examines how the principle of democratic accountability is integrated in the planning and 
  18  See  Mathias  Koenig-Archibugi,  “Transnational  Corporations  and  Public  Accountability”,  Government  and 
Opposition, Vol. 39, No. 2, 2004, pp. 234-259.
  19 Robert Behn, Rethinking Democratic Accountability, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 2001, p. 12.
  20 Björn Müller-Wille, “Improving the democratic accountability of EU intelligence”, Intelligence and National Security, 
Vol. 21, No. 1, p. 104.55
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implementation of EU’s international security policies. The analysis looks at the forms of 
accountability to which the EU is subject in the architecture of global governance, peer and 
reputational accountability, in the case of international counterterrorism. 
From a general point of view, the emergence of a new European approach towards the 
architecture of international security has been marked by the European Security Strategy 
(ESS). Adopted on December 2003, the ESS emphasized an active role for the EU in the 
dynamics of global security, accentuating the European engagement in the fight against 
international terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, organized crime and failed states. From 
the democratic accountability point of view, the ESS has accentuated the development of 
an international order based on legitimate rules and effective governance21. This approach 
supports Michael Goodhart’s perspective of democratic accountability, where power is 
answerable to the right standards instead of the right principals. In other words, the agent, 
the EU, gives account of its practices through the degree of commitment and respect towards 
international norms. 
Looking at the European role in the fight against international terrorism, it can be easily 
noted  that  the  EU  has  registered  a  progressive  evolution,  from  unofficial  cooperation 
arrangements, like the TREVI Cooperation, mainly a secretive group, to a coordinated 
framework,  based  on  institutionalized  dynamics,  capable  of  shaping  wider  regulatory 
frameworks. In the aftermath of 9/11, the EU strengthened its global voice and adopted 
its  first  Plan  of  Action  for  the  fight  against  terrorism22.  The  Plan  of  Action  comprised 
multidimensional measures and called for a coordinate response in the EU’s global action. 
Furthermore, the EU’s involvement in the world has been rooted on the relevant UN 
resolutions23. 
In 2003, EU’s role in the fight against international terrorism gained a relative recognition 
on the world stage through the ESS, and through its increased interest in shaping the global 
dynamics with a different approach, based primarily on a soft focus. In 2004, through the 
“Declaration on Combating Terrorism”, the European Council emphasized the engagement 
of the EU and its Member States “to combat all forms of terrorism, in accordance with the 
fundamental principles of the Union, the provision of the Charter of the United Nations 
and the obligations set out under the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 
(2001)”24. In the following year, the EU external counterterrorism agenda has been pushed 
forward by the Madrid and London attacks. On November 2005, the Council adopted the 
“European Union Strategy to Counter-Terrorism (CT)”25, which further integrated the EU’s 
interest in pursuing its goals in a democratic and accountable way. Organizing its actions 
around  four  objectives,  prevention,  protection,  pursuit  and  response,  the  EU  rhetoric 
outlined “the European Union’s Strategic commitment to combat terrorism globally while 
respecting human rights, and make Europe safer, allowing its citizens to live in an area of 
  21  See  “European  Security  Strategy”,  Brussels,  12  December  2003,  http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/
cmsUpload/78367.pdf.
  22 European Council, “Conclusions and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary European Council Meeting on 21 September 
2001”, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/140.en.pdf.
  23 Ibid.
  24 European Council, “Declaration on Combating Terrorism”, Brussels, 25 March 2004, http://www.consilium.europa.
eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/DECL-25.3.pdf.
  25 Council of The European Union, “EU Strategy to Counterterrorism”, Brussels, 20 November 2005, http://register.
consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/05/st14/st14469-re04.en05.pdf.56
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freedom, security and justice”26, Furthermore, the EU’s efforts to tackle the challenges of 
international terrorism have been deepened in 2009 through the Stockholm Programme 
(2010-14), which emphasized the continuum between the two dimensions of security, the 
internal and external spheres, in ensuring a secure international environment. 
The inclination of the EU’s counterterrorism efforts towards the promotion and the 
respect of international norms, and the high priority given by the Union to the actions in 
conjunction with the provision of the United Nations Charter, have considerably increased 
the EU soft power profile in the sphere of global politics. Moreover, this image, product of 
the EU rhetoric, created great expectations regarding the European practice in the arena of 
global security. 
The first mechanism of the analysis, peer accountability, refers to the results of mutual 
evaluation, capable of overseeing the exercise of power at global level. Given the common 
nature of the terrorism threat for all the international actors, there is a high level of peer 
cooperation in this spectrum. Furthermore, the cooperation is in a conspicuous need of 
maintaining high standards. The actors that are poorly rated by their peers lose credibility 
and  are  likely  to  have  difficulty  in  persuading  them  to  cooperate.  Therefore  they  are 
predisposed to failure in achieving their own purposes. In other words, the mechanism 
of peer accountability can hold the actors accountable through the standard of critical 
assessment or the refusal of cooperation, as forms of sanctions. 
The  EU  counterterrorism  actions  and  performances  are  discussed  through  multiple 
channels, from multilateral forums with the UN, NATO, the Council of Europe and OSCE, 
to bilateral forums with actors such as US, Russia, India or Turkey among others. Both 
types of forums are focused on consultation, planning, technical assistance and exchange 
of experience, addressing the issue of cooperation, as a form of sanction power at this 
extended level.
Beyond the rhetorical commitments, the European Union practice emphasized that 
the EU is a prominent player in the United Nations system. For example, the EU and 
the UN Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) are engaged in a series of similar actions, 
which enables the observations of practices undertaken in the fight against international 
terrorism, facilitating thus a form of power control. The data emphasize that the cooperation 
between the EU and the UN is extensive, approaching a wide range of issues, from aspects 
of  prevention  and  law  enforcements,  to  issues  related  to  response  mechanisms.  From 
2011, the EU became an observer within the UN system27, being a recognized part of 
the multilateral agreements. This acknowledged role is in fact a clear indication of the 
EU’s status in the global fora, and of the credibility it has acquired over the last decades.
The Report of the UN Secretary-General regarding the implementation of the UN CT 
Strategy, published in April 2012, has recognized the role of the European Union in the 
fight against international terrorism28. The EU received a favorable assessment in its role 
in assisting the Central Asian States in implementing the UN CT Strategy, in conjunction 
  26 Ibid.
  27UN/GA, “Participation of the European Union in the work of the United Nations”, http://www.un.org/ga/search/
view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/65/276.
  28 UN/GA, “United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy: activities of the United Nations system in implementing 
the Strategy.Report of the Secretary-General”,
http://www.un.org/en/terrorism/ctitf/pdfs/A%2066%20762%20English.pdf. 57
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with the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force and the United Nations Regional 
Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA), and for its contribution to the 
UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI)29. Also, the UN Security 
Council resolutions enable a common ground of assessment for the actors engaged in the 
fight against international terrorism. More precisely, this framework enables a comparative 
valuation of practices, empowering a form of soft pressure on actors to bring their regulations 
to high standard30. The UN underlined the role of the EU in implementing the provisions of 
the UN/SC Resolution 137331, directed against the financial resources of terrorism, through 
the establishment of an electronic list of persons, groups and entities in relation to which 
restrictive measures are applied. This example emphasized the manner in which the EU 
respected the lines of cooperation32, and has been labeled as a relative success in EU’s 
fight against international terrorism. In other words, this contribution can be interpreted 
as a reliable commitment to the international norms specific to the spectrum of global 
governance, limiting the arbitrary in the international realm.
Another example of peer cooperation through which democratic accountability can be 
achieved is the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF)33, The Forum emerged in 2011 
as an informal platform aimed to enhance global cooperation in countering terrorism. 
The Forum functions through regional working groups, that are held accountable through 
standard-setting documents which are intended to collate good practices. From October 
2012, the EU co-chaired with Turkey the GCTF Working Group on Horn of Africa focusing 
on capacity building34. Being a close partner of the GCTF framework, EU’s actions are 
dependent on the approval and the consent of the peers, ensuring a supranational form 
of democratic accountability for the EU practices. It is important to note that, despite the 
lack of formal agreements, this type of framework is able to oversee the control of power at 
global level and to sanction the incongruous deviations. 
Beyond the UN framework, the EU actions are subject of observations in international 
fora as the Council of Europe, OSCE, or NATO. These types of forums explore common 
goals and aim to strengthen the cooperation on areas of interest. As in the previous case, 
the cooperation factor indicates the actor weight and credibility in global affairs. These 
cooperation frameworks are essential due to their focused areas of actions. For example, the 
EU-Council of Europe dialogue focuses on criminal justice, capacity-building, integration, 
intercultural dialogue and de-radicalisation in prisons. On the other hand, the EU-OSCE 
dialogue focuses on Central Asia, and the prevention of counterterrorism radicalisation. The 
EU-NATO cooperation addresses issues that comprise measures of prevention, capacity-
building or de-radicalisation. The quality of cooperation, is perhaps more visible in the 
bilateral frameworks, where the EU maintains close relations with the United States. The 
relation between the EU and the US is by no means perfectly symmetrical, but what is 
  29 Ibid.
  30 David Cortright, George A. Lopez (eds.), Uniting Against Terror: Cooperative Nonmilitary Responses to the Global 
Terrorist Threat, MIT Press, 2007.
  31 UN/SC, “Resolution1373 (2001)”, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sc7158.doc.htm.
  32 UN/SC, “Report of the European Union to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 
(2001) concerning counter-terrorism”, http://eeas.europa.eu/organisations/un/docs/eu1373_en.pdf.
  33 Council of the European Union, “Annual Report on the Implementation of the EU Counter Terrorism Strategy”, 
Brussels 12 November 2012, http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/st16/st16471-ad01.en12.pdf , p. 45.
  34 GCTF, “Inaugural Meeting of the Horn of Africa Working Group”, February 8-10 2012, Dar es Salaam.58
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essential is the responsibility that this mechanism creates on the actors involved in common 
practices.  Through  forums,  meetings,  working  groups,  and  other  types  of  cooperation 
instruments, the power responds to standards and objectives, aiming to ensure a responsible 
exercise of power.
Although these types of cooperation, multilateral or bilateral, do not sanction power 
directly,  they  offer  an  enhanced  means  of  adjustment  to  the  international  rules  and 
rights. The manner in which they induce a review of policies and practices can be seen 
as a mechanism that enables accountability in the normative sense, in the direction of 
good governance. Overall, the EU involvement in multilateral and bilateral cooperation 
frameworks ensures a proximal use of power in the extended sphere of global governance. 
The  peer  accountability  analysis  emphasizes  the  absence  of  discouraging  cooperation 
factors or of any form of sanction, a fact that enforces the EU democratic accountability 
power in the global governance arena.
The second mechanism, the reputational accountability, is dependent on two essential 
dimensions,  transparency  and  effectiveness.  The  presence  of  the  former  enables  the 
functioning  of  the  latter.  Both  of  these  dimensions  can  enforce  or  diminish  the  actor 
credibility, and can be valid mechanisms capable of ensuring the control of power at 
global level. As Benner et.al. pointed out, the loss of credibility is one of the most effective 
negative sanctioning mechanisms to further accountability35. In similar terms, Terry and 
Kate Macdonald have emphasized the mechanism of “public disempowerment”, which 
disable the public political agents, through an effective sanction imposed upon them by 
publics when they consider it appropriate, in order to minimize the agent’s capacity to 
continue exercising public power36.
Firstly,  the  dimension  of  transparency  is  an  essential  precondition  for  the  holistic 
functioning  of  the  reputational  mechanism.  In  fact,  the  standard  of  transparency  is  of 
particular importance, being one of the most prominent aspects of democratic accountability 
concerning  the  practice  of  the  international  actors.  In  Gupta  words,  “disclosure  of 
information has become a heavily relied on tool used to strengthen accountability, so much 
so, that transparency has become a moral and political imperative in global governance”37.
The European rhetoric reflected in multiple rows the promotion and the respect for 
transparency, asserting its commitments to the standard of transparency and implicitly to an 
efficient exercise of power. In practice, the ex post transparency has been concretized by 
regular publications of annual reports, describing in satisfactory detail the four dimensions 
of the EU counterterrorism Strategy. It is important to note the role of the new technologies 
that facilitate cost-effective communicating, managing and monitoring information. The 
public open version and the accessibility of these reports, bring important assets to the 
EU efforts in the fight against international terrorism within the framework of democratic 
accountability. improvements. Their regular publication, backed up by critical assessment, 
is an essential tool Furthermore, these annual reports are essential tools that facilitate the 
path for necessary of the democratic accountability governance. 
  35 Thorsten Benner, Wolfgang H. Reinicke, Jan Martin Witte, “Multisectorial Networks in Global Governance: Towards 
a Pluralistic System of Accountability”, p. 200. 
  36 Terry Macdonald, Kate Macdonald, “Non-Electoral Accountability in Global Politics: Strengthening Democratic 
Control within the Global Garment Industry”, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2006, p. 104.
  37 See Dipak K. Gupta, Understanding terrorism and Political Violence, Routledge, 2008.59
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However, transparency must be constant, and not sporadic. Although the provision of 
information has been long advocated by the EU framework, not all the pieces of the CT 
architecture are following the transparency dynamic. More precisely, EU’s intelligence 
agencies involved in the fight against terrorism have been highly reluctant regarding the 
provision of information in a transparent manner. They are an integral part of the EU 
instruments for tackling international terrorism and they need to respond to similar standards 
of transparency. One of the most prominent examples is Europol, which publishes an annual 
report named the EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT), with the aim to offer an 
account of the state of terrorism in the EU, from a law enforcement perspective. However, 
the report fails to offer a direct account of the Europol practices undertaken in the fight 
against terrorism. The shifted focus from concrete measures to the general picture of threats, 
led to ambiguous perceptions regarding their compliance with the mandates entrusted, and 
the way power is used. More precisely, the means employed by the Europol for the purpose 
of preventing international terrorism are criticised for compromising international standards, 
in particular from the point of view of human and fundamental rights and privacy. Although 
the Europol practice in the fight against international terrorism implies a soft focus, the issues 
of privacy protection, the type of data held by Europol, and how this data is used, are raising 
numerous unanswerable questions in terms of transparency and respect for international 
human rights standards. This ambiguity has important reflections on the Europol credibility, 
and on the EU as a whole, in the fight against international terrorism. 
Moreover, the importance of transparency as an essential dimension of accountability, 
continuously grows, as the secrecy and opacity of the intelligence agencies can be leading 
factors of the “securization” process. As Loader pointed out, “the terrorist threat demands 
new responses that seem both urgent and inevitable and lifts such issues above the realm of 
normal politics and subsumes them within a discourse of effectiveness that evinces a strong 
tendency to trump considerations of civil liberty”38. In other words, the protection of the 
public has become a ubiquitous means to justify the deployment of sensitive mechanisms for 
the area of privacy, despite founded grounds. More precisely, a consistent part of the Action 
Plan to CT is not direct connected with terrorism, but with general security issues. This fact 
augments the ambiguity and deeply undermines the effectiveness of the counterterrorism 
practices39. While it is understandable that a certain degree of secrecy is unavoidable in 
security and intelligence operations, the need for transparency and accountability in the 
field of security and intelligence stays imperative for the democratic legitimacy of the 
agent practices40. This is supported by the UN General Assembly argument that “effective 
counter-terrorism measures and the protection of human rights are not conflicting goals, 
but complementary and mutually reinforcing”41. In similar terms, the European Convention 
on Human Rights augmented that “democracy is not simply a notion of power lying in 
the hands of an electoral majority - it must be inclusive, accountable and respect human 
rights”42.
  38 Ian Loader, “Policing, securitization and democratization in Europe”, Criminology and Criminal Justice, Vol. 2, No. 
2, 2002, p. 137.
  39 Statewatch, “Statewatch Report”, http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/exceptional-and-draconian.pdf. 
  40 Jelle van Buuren, “Secret Truth. The EU Joint Situation Centre”, Eurowatch, Amsterdam, 2009, p. 9.
  41 UN /GA, “United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy”, Resolution 60/288, Annex. 
  42 European Court of Human Rights, “European Convention on Human Rights”, http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/
Convention_ENG.pdf. 60
Ana Postolache
Undoubtedly, the EU has important assets in transparency terms, but not a complete 
capital, able to respond in an accountable manner to the demands of the international 
spectrum. Furthermore, the high expectations crafted by the EU rhetoric and the practical 
fragmented image impose costs on the EU international reputation and the way power is 
used in the external dimension. 
Secondly,  the  mechanism  of  reputational  accountability  addresses  the  question  of 
effectiveness. The analysis explores the outcome of the EU practices or the achievement of 
the proposed goals. The failure to fulfill its commitments in accordance with its mandate or 
its strategy, as in the present case, has repercussions on the EU reputational accountability. 
The point of reference is the EU Action Plan of the CT Strategy. According to the security 
continuum, the Plan comprises a set of actions that link both the internal and external 
dimensions of security. Of particular importance for the analysis is the external dimension 
and the implications of this dimension on the framework of democratic accountability in 
the architecture of global governance. However, given the internal-external continuum, the 
reflections of the internal measures on the external architecture are also taken into account. 
The EU counterterrorism Strategy focuses on four strands: prevent, pursue, protect and 
respond. The extent to which the EU achieved the proposed objectives in the external 
dimension of the four strands, indicates the feasibility of its dictums, and can either enhance 
or diminish the EU legitimacy at global level. 
The first cluster of the CT Strategy, prevention, refers to the actions of radicalisation and 
de-radicalisation, both in Europe and internationally. Outside the European borders, the EU 
focused on the relationships with the neighborhood countries, where a special attention 
has been given to the Southern dimension of the European Neighborhood Policy. More 
precisely, in 2005, the EU enforced the preventive dimension by adopting the “Strategy 
for Combating Radicalisation, and Recruitment to Terrorism”, aiming to provide technical 
assistance to third countries, as a way to impede terrorism43. The Strategy accentuated the 
EU soft means to tackle terrorism, and emphasized the need for dialogue and understanding 
between cultures. Furthermore, the cooperation has been concretized through the Euro-
Med Association Agreements with Tunisia, Israel, Morocco, Jordan, Egypt, and Algeria, but 
specific clauses on counterterrorism are present only in the agreements with Egypt and Algeria. 
However, these clauses are limited to vague commitments regarding the implementation of 
terrorism related UN/SC Resolutions44. being unable to ensure efficient means to tackle the 
issue of terrorism. Furthermore, the EU involvement in supporting the fight against terrorism 
in the MENA countries has been challenged by the prioritization of security and stability 
over democracy and human rights. The practical deployment of these sorts of action, 
infringe the ground of democratic accountability in the global architecture, diminishing the 
credibility of the agent considerably. In 2011, the Arab Spring has brought new processes 
in the MENA region, opening up the possibility to fight terrorism with democratic tools. As 
a result of the new developments, the EU advanced a new approach, materialized through 
the release of the document “A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood: A Review of 
the European Neighborhood Policy”. The document addressed the issue of radicalization 
  43 Council of the European Union, “The European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to 
Terrorism”, Brussels 24 November 2005, http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/05/st14/st14781-re01.en05.pdf. 
  44 Alex MacKenzie, Christian Kaunert, Sarah Léonard, “EU Counterterrorism and the Southern Mediterranean Countries 
after the Arab Spring: New Potential for Cooperation?”, Democracy and Security, Vol. 9, No. 1-2, 2013, pp. 140-141.61
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as a structural problem, in need of comprehensive responses. However, two years after 
the Arab Spring, EU’s role in counter-radicalisation in the region is still not consistent. 
In addressing structural problems such as social and economic inequalities, considered 
important factors of terrorism occurrences, EU’s actions are lagging behind. Furthermore, 
the developments in Mali have increased the need to address the radicalization factors in a 
more coherent way. From the democratic accountability point of view, the lack of efficient 
results in spite of the grandiose rhetoric does not place the EU in a very favorable light. The 
gaps between rhetoric and practice are evident, and their impact on the actor’s credibility, 
already crumpled by the actions undertaken before the Arab Spring, are considerable. 
The second cluster of the EU counterterrorism Strategy, namely protect, refers to a better 
protection of the potential targets, and the reduction of vulnerabilities through improved 
security of the borders and transport.
In the case of boarder management, the EU succeeded in the implementation of the Visa 
Information System with third countries45. Furthermore, the EU improved the basic security 
measures in the case of air cargo transport46, and, in the case of maritime security, the EU 
contributed to a positive implementation of CT measures in the external sphere. According 
to the EU CT Report, during 2012 the number of incidents in the Horn of Africa region has 
declined as a result of the provisions of the Commission Recommendation 2010/159/EU47 
regarding measures for self-protection and the prevention of piracy and armed robbery 
against ships, and through the EU NAVFOR military naval presence in the Horn of Africa. 
However, the larger picture of maritime and transport security is still in need for more 
efficient actions.
The third strand, pursue, has been defined by the EU CT Strategy as the investigation, and 
prosecution of terrorists across and outside Europe. This spectrum comprises efforts aimed 
to uncover terrorist networks, to impede communication, travel and planning activities by 
terrorists and their supporters, to cut off funding and access to attack materials, to investigate 
terrorist offenses and to bring terrorists to justice. 
The  investigation  of  terrorist  networks  can  be  difficult  to  pursue  through  ordinary 
procedures. Most of the time, the investigative efforts are raising concerns regarding the 
respect of human rights and the privacy of data. The EU efforts on strengthening the dialogue 
with international partners and with third countries have further augmented this risk. More 
precisely, the EU’s reputation and the way of using power, has been fissured by the struggle 
between  privacy  and  security  in  the  case  of  the  Passenger  Name  Record  Agreements 
with the United States. Although, the issue of terrorism is in need of special investigative 
techniques, this demarche cannot be performed beyond the law, with subversive tools. 
Moreover, in pursuing terrorism globally, the EU emphasized the need for political 
and technical dialogue with third countries. The EU efforts to fight terrorism globally, to 
investigate and prosecute terrorist suspects, has been concretized by the law enforcement 
  45 In October 2011 the visa codes have been implemented by Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia, 
in May 2012 they have been implemented by the countries of the Middle East, and on 2 October 2012 the visa codes 
have been implemented by Afghanistan, Iran and Arab countries.
  46 See Council of the European Union, “Annual Report on the Implementation of the EU Counter Terrorism Strategy”.
  47 European Commission, “Commission Recommendation of 11 March 2010 on self-protection and the prevention of 
privacy and armed robbery against ships” , 2010/159/EU, Official Journal of the European Union  L 67, 17.03.2010, 
pp. 1-14.62
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perspective. Despite the complex web of external relations, the EU cooperation with third 
countries registered, in the last decade, an upward trend in this direction. The outcome of 
EU actions emphasizes positive results in South Asia. For example, the case of EU assistance 
to Afghanistan marked an important legislative progress in police and judicial capacity 
building, contributing to a decrease in actions of violent extremism. The EUPOL Mission 
in Afghanistan has brought important contributions to the positive developments registered 
in this regard. In a similar manner, the EUPOL Mission to Ramallah has contributed to the 
enhancement of the law enforcement perspective in Palestine. 
A special attention in the investigation and the prosecution of terrorism has been given 
to  the  southern  neighborhood.  The  countries  in  North  Africa  have  been  of  particular 
importance, because of the terrorist groups based in this countries, such as Al-Qaeda 
in the Islamic Maghreb. The efforts to counter terrorism in the southern neighborhood 
have been further complicated by the Arab Spring events that emerged in 2011, where 
the effectiveness of EU strategic goals have been challenged by the dynamic nature of 
changes. More precisely, the events have spread a sense of general insecurity across the 
MENA countries, being in need of effective investigation mechanisms. The EU has been 
involved from an incipient stage in the events from Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco, advocating 
its readiness to assist the emerging democratic governments of the Arab world in the reform 
processes, guaranteeing in the meantime the respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. However, at the time of writing, the progress is slow. Of course, an effective 
cooperation depends not only on the EU, but also on the third countries’ willingness to 
cooperate in this field. The unsettled political changes in the MENA region, the lack of 
institutional capacities, the absence of international standards in the exchange of data, are 
substantial factors that limit the effectiveness of EU actions.  
The fourth objective, response, aims to improve the coordination with international 
organisations on managing the response to terrorist attacks. In tackling the terrorism crises, 
the EU developed in the external sphere the programme Prevention Preparedness Response 
to Natural and Man-made Disasters48. This mechanism has been developed together with 
the southern and eastern neighborhood countries, and has a prime focus on civil protection 
mechanisms.  The  recent  events  of  January  16,  2013,  have  tested  the  viability  of  this 
mechanism in the case of a terrorist attack. Despite the high expectation, the attack on the 
strategic Algerian gas facility, In Amenas, has been confronted with the lack of EU responses. 
This practice brought numerous costs on the instruments developed by the European Union 
to tackle the issue of terrorism, and on the EU international role in this field. 
Overall, the EU CT implementation is poor. The EU is far from meeting the expectations of 
its commitments in the fluid system of global governance in terms of countering international 
terrorism. Despite the emphatic rhetorical commitments towards the democratic practices 
and principles in this spectrum, the evidence emphasizes that the road from discourse 
to practice is intertwined with multiple difficulties and faces heterogeneous lines. The 
prevalence of the cannons of good governance and the rule of law that have nourished the 
EU soft power status regarding the cooperation with third parties is fissured by the MENA 
cases, and most recently by the In Amenas attack. The achievements and the pitfalls of the 
  48 Teemu Sinkkonen, “Counterterrorism in External Action-The EU’s Toolbox for Responding to Terrorism Abroad”, 
FIIA Briefing Paper, No. 129, p. 6.63
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EU’s actions bring forward the need of the Union to develop and improve its capabilities 
in tackling the issue of terrorism in the external dimension, and the need to exercise power 
with more transparent and efficient mechanisms.  
Conclusion
Over the last decades, the developments in the architecture of global governance have 
transformed the sphere of foreign policy into a valid domain in need of accountability. 
Exceeding the Westphalia patterns of democracy and the narrow statist view of politics, 
the framework of democratic accountability in global politics imposes new conditions, to 
which adjustment is necessary.  
The  analysis  emphasizes  that  the  case  for  democratic  accountability  has  gained 
momentum in the EU rhetoric, but has not delivered the expected results in practice. In the 
last decade, the European Union has been able to ensure a good degree of accountability 
in terms of working within the UN framework, implementing with success the UN/SC 
resolutions, and partially providing regular updates and transparent information regarding 
the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, but it has not been able to provide a complete picture. 
The  EU  democratic  accountability  in  global  governance  is  challenged  by  the  lack  of 
transparency, secrecy, and weakly justified practices. While the analysis emphasized a 
series of achievements, there is ample space for improvement and the EU policies have to 
rise to the challenges of accountability in global governance.
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